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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, juries have been hailed as a model of popular
participation in government. In the nineteenth century, Alexis de
Tocqueville famously praised the American jury as “both the most
effective way of establishing the people’s rule and the most efficient
way of teaching them how to rule.”1 Modern defenders of the jury
have also often emphasized its role as a tool for democratic partici-
pation in the justice system.2
But even as he praised the jury’s role as a political institution,
de Tocqueville worried that jurors might lack the knowledge needed
to perform their judicial function properly:
The jury system arose in the infancy of society, at a time when
only simple questions of fact were submitted to the courts; and
it is no easy task to adapt it to the needs of a highly civilized
nation, where the relations between men have multiplied
exceedingly and have been thoughtfully elaborated in a learned
manner.3
Another nineteenth-century writer, Mark Twain, expressed the
same concern in much blunter terms:
The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and
a premium upon ignorance, stupidity and perjury.... I desire to
tamper with the jury law. I wish to so alter it as to put a
premium on intelligence and character, and close the jury box
against idiots, blacklegs, and people who do not read newspa-
pers.4
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969).
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 8-13, 139-41 (First Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2000) (defending the jury as a
tool for implementing “deliberative democracy”); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83-
88, 94-96 (1998) (defending the role of the jury in the Bill of Rights as a popular check on the
power of political elites); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S
GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 12-13 (2013) (praising the jury for promoting “popular
sovereignty”).
3. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 271.
4. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 321-22 (Edgar Marquess Branch & Harriet Elinor Smith
eds., 3d ed. 1993).
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Today’s society is arguably even more “highly civilized” than
that described by de Tocqueville in the 1830s, or at least more
complex. And today’s trials often require jurors to evaluate evidence
and testimony far more complicated than that of de Tocqueville’s
time or Twain’s.5 These changes make it all the more vital that
jurors “possess intelligence and honesty,” while avoiding “ignorance
and stupidity,” as Twain put it.6 It is therefore essential to ask
whether jurors have the knowledge and cognitive abilities needed
to cope with the challenges of modern trials.
A great deal of evidence suggests that voters often fail to acquire
the knowledge needed to cope with the enormous size, scope, and
complexity of modern government.7 The majority of the public is
often ignorant of very basic political information, and voters also
often do a poor job of evaluating the political information they do
know.8 Given the oft-made analogy between jury service and
political participation, it is important to ask whether jurors are
prone to similar pitfalls. Do they also often make poor decisions out
of ignorance or illogical evaluation of evidence?
This Article considers that question. My tentative conclusion is
that jurors are likely superior to voters in terms of both acquiring
knowledge and utilizing it in a rational way. But ignorance and
irrationality do sometimes compromise jury decision making,
especially in complex cases. They are even more likely to bedevil
5. See infra Part II.
6. TWAIN, supra note 4, at 321.
7. For evidence demonstrating the widespread nature of political ignorance, see, for
example, SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2003)
(summarizing evidence of extensive voter ignorance); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996) (same);
RICHARD SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE? FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN
VOTER (2008) (same); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287,
1290-1304 (2004) (same); Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL
REV. 413, 413-19 (1998) (same). For a detailed recent review, see ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER ch. 1 (2013) [hereinafter
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE]. See also GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION
OF PUBLIC OPINION: FACT AND ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS  (2004)
(explaining how polls often overstate the true degree of public knowledge).
8. On the latter point, see BRYAN D. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY
DEMOCRACIES MAKE BAD DECISIONS (2007); SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE,
supra note 7, at 62-89.
1170 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1167
efforts to use jury-like institutions to make broad public policy
decisions, as opposed to merely decide discrete cases.
Part I summarizes the problem of political ignorance in the case
of voters, and explains some theoretical reasons why we would
expect jurors to acquire greater relevant knowledge than voters do
and to use it more wisely. Jurors have stronger incentives to both
acquire political information and analyze it in a rational way.
Unlike voters, who have only an infinitesimal chance of influencing
electoral outcomes, jurors presumably realize that their individual
votes are likely to make a decisive difference to the outcome of a
trial.
Part II discusses the relevant empirical evidence on jury
knowledge and rationality. Much of that evidence shows juries
performing fairly well. But it also suggests that ignorance and bias
undermine the quality of jury decisions in unusually complex cases,
such as ones involving scientific evidence, punitive damages, and
complex jury instructions. Overall, juries perform better than voters
in large part because of the ways in which trials differ from
elections. Unlike voters, jurors usually decide only a narrow, specific
case rather than a broad set of policy issues, and they are required
to listen to extensive evidence from both sides before making a
decision.
Finally, Part III expresses skepticism about the possibility of
using jury-like mechanisms to help decide broad policy questions.
Such proposals break down some of the key differences between jury
service and voting that make the former function more effectively
than the latter.
I. VOTER KNOWLEDGE VS. JUROR KNOWLEDGE
Widespread political ignorance among voters gives us some
reason to worry that similar ignorance might impair jurors. At the
same time, however, there is reason to believe that the problem of
jury ignorance during trials is likely less severe than that confront-
ing voters in elections.
2014] JURY IGNORANCE AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE 1171
A. The Problem of Rational Political Ignorance
Extensive evidence suggests that political ignorance is wide-
spread among voters. Over sixty years of survey data reveal that
most of the public has a fairly low level of political knowledge.9 That
has not changed in recent years. Soon after the important 2010
congressional midterm election, only 46 percent of adults knew that
the Republican Party had won control of the House of Representa-
tives, but not the Senate.10 In 2003, 70 percent of the public was
unaware of the enactment of President George W. Bush’s massive
prescription drug plan, the biggest federal program in almost forty
years.11 In 2009, only 24 percent of Americans realized that the im-
portant “cap and trade” proposal then recently passed by the House
of Representatives as an effort to combat global warming addressed
“environmental issues.”12 Forty-six percent believed that it was either
a “health care reform” or a “regulatory reform for Wall Street.”13
This kind of ignorance extends beyond specific issues to
structural features of American politics, the nature of political
ideology, and the activities of prominent individual politicians.14 For
example, a 2006 Zogby poll found that 58 percent of Americans
cannot name the three branches of the federal government:
executive, legislative, and judicial.15 Only 28 percent can identify
two or more of the five rights protected by the First Amendment.16
9. See sources cited supra note 7, especially DELLI CARPINI & KEETER.
10. Public Knows Basic Facts About Politics, Economics, But Struggles with Specifics, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Nov. 18, 2010), http://people-press.org/reports/
pdf/677.pdf.
11. Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance Threatens Democracy,
CATO INSTITUTE: POLICY ANALYSIS 1, 5-6 (Sept. 22, 2004), http://www.cato.org/
publications/policy-analysis/when-ignorance-isnt-bliss-how-political-ignorance-threatens-
democracy.
12. Toplines-Cap & Trade: National Survey of 1,000 Lively Voters, RASSMUSSEN REPORTS
(May 7-8, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/toplines/pt_survey
_toplines/may_2009/toplines_cap_trade_i_may_7_8_2009.
13. Id.
14. For a detailed summary of the evidence, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at ch. 1.
15. Brit Hume, Zogby Poll: Most Americans Can Name Three Stooges, But Not Three
Branches of Gov’t, FOX NEWS (Aug. 15, 2006), http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,208577,00.html.
16. MCCORMICK TRIBUNE FREEDOM MUSEUM, Americans’ Awareness of First Amendment
Freedoms, THE FORUM FOR EDUC. & DEMOCRACY (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.forumforeduca
tion.org/node/147.
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Right before he was nominated for the vice presidency in the
summer of 2012, 43 percent of Americans had never heard of
Representative Paul Ryan and only 32 percent knew that he was a
member of the House of Representatives, as opposed to a senator,
governor, or secretary of state.17 This degree of ignorance was
striking in view of the fact that Ryan had been a prominent figure
in national politics for several years and the GOP’s leading spokes-
man on entitlement policy and spending issues.18
Pollsters and public opinion scholars have found numerous other
examples of widespread political ignorance.19 Such ignorance is not
of recent origin, but has been a common finding of public opinion
research for many decades.20 It is not merely an artifact of recent
generations and has persisted despite major increases in education
levels and intelligence as measured by IQ scores.21 The rise of the
Internet and other electronic media has also had little impact on
political knowledge levels.22
Political ignorance persists at least in large part because it is
rational. Because the chance of any one vote influencing the
outcome of an election is infinitesimally small, there is little
incentive to become knowledgeable about politics if the only reason
for doing so is to increase the likelihood of casting a “correct”
17. Ilya Somin, Public Ignorance About Paul Ryan, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 11, 2012),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/08/11/public-ignorance-about-paul-ryan/.
18. Id.
19. See sources cited supra note 7; see also SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE,
supra note 7, at 17-33 (reviewing numerous examples).
20. See, e.g., ALTHAUS, supra note 7, at 3-4; ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN
VOTER (1960); DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 7; SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 18-19.
21. See JAMES R. FLYNN, ARE WE GETTING SMARTER? RISING IQ IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 6 (2012) (noting that the average American IQ rose fifteen points over the last half
of the twentieth century); SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at
171-73 (discussing failure of rising education levels to reduce political ignorance). 
22. What Americans Know, 1989-2007: Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Changed Little
by News and Information Revolutions, PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS
(Apr. 15, 2007), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/319.pdf (showing little or no
increase in political knowledge since the rise of the Internet and other modern media); see also
BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLUTION OF
POLITICAL POWER, 229-30 (2003); MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 60-
61 & fig.4.1 (2009); MARKUS PRIOR, POST-BROADCAST DEMOCRACY: HOW MEDIA CHOICE
INCREASES INEQUALITY IN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLARIZES ELECTIONS ch. 4, at 94-141
(2007); Markus Prior, News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps
in Political Knowledge and Turnout, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 577, 577-78 (2005).
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ballot.23 In a presidential election, for example, one voter’s odds of
casting a decisive ballot are about one in sixty million or even less.24
Even in smaller-scale elections at the state and local levels, the
chance of casting a decisive ballot is still very low, albeit higher
than in a presidential contest.25
B. Rational Irrationality
In addition to having little incentive to acquire political informa-
tion, most voters also have little reason to try hard to evaluate the
political knowledge they do possess in an unbiased way. Indeed, the
theory of rational ignorance implies that most of the political
knowledge we have is likely to be acquired for reasons other than
learning the truth about politics and public policy.26 Such reasons
include entertainment value, validating preexisting views, or
cheering on one’s preferred party or ideology.27 This leads to what
economist Bryan Caplan labels “rational irrationality”—a tendency
to assess political information in a highly biased way that often
leads to illogical and seriously misguided conclusions.28
Just as sports fans evaluate new information about their favorite
team and its rivals in a biased fashion, “political fans” tend to be
similarly biased in favor of their preferred party and ideology.29 This
is individually rational behavior for the same reason that political
ignorance is rational for most voters. Since there is little payoff to
getting at the truth of political issues, biased “political fans” can
enjoy following politics without suffering negative consequences for
their cognitive errors. But such individually rational behavior is
23. Anthony Downs first developed the theory of rational political ignorance. ANTHONY
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-59 (1957). For recent defenses and
extensions of the theory, see CAPLAN, supra note 8; SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 62-89; Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions
in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 257-60 (2006).
24. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 70-71 (discussing
alternative estimates of the probability of decisiveness).
25. Id. at 64.
26. See id. at 64-65 (discussing this issue in greater detail).
27. Id. at 78-79.
28. See CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 17-18; Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance Versus Rational
Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3 (2001).
29. For this comparison and data supporting it, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 78-82 and Somin, supra note 23, at 261-62.
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collectively harmful, as voter bias influences public policy and
electoral results.30
Ironically, those most interested in politics may be most prone
to this kind of bias.31 Just as the most committed sports fans tend
to be both the most knowledgeable about the sports they watch and
the most biased in favor of their preferred teams, so too the most
dedicated political fans are also the ones least receptive to evidence
that cuts against their preexisting beliefs. Indeed, they even tend to
discuss politics only with those who agree with them32 and read
political media that reinforces rather than challenges their
ideology.33
C. Implications for Juries
Does the rational ignorance and irrationality that afflicts voters
also undermine the quality of jury decisions? In some ways, jurors
are similar to voters. Both juries and the electorate are largely made
up of ordinary citizens who, in their daily lives, have little incentive
to acquire information about the issues they are supposed to decide
when they cast their votes. Just as most voters spend little time
studying public policy, most jurors probably devote little effort to
studying law or learning how best to evaluate evidence.
In addition, both jurors and voters have little or no self-inter-
ested stake in the decisions they make. Even if a voter has a strong
interest in, for example, electing the candidate that will adopt
policies that will increase the voter’s income, the chance that his or
her vote will determine the outcome is vanishingly small. Jurors, if
anything, have even less in the way of self-interested stakes in their
decisions than voters. A juror with even a modest financial interest
in the outcome of a case is likely to be removed for cause. The lack
of a self-interested stake may reduce jurors’ incentives to learn
30. This is the key thesis of Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter. See CAPLAN,
supra note 8, at 2.
31. See, e.g., DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE 32-34 (2006) (explaining how the
most knowledgeable and committed citizens also tend to be more closed-minded and unwilling
to consider alternative views).
32. Id. at 32.
33. See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of
Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, 59 J. OF COMM. 19, 33-35 (2009).
2014] JURY IGNORANCE AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE 1175
necessary information and evaluate it rationally, although it does
eliminate the possibility of bias caused by the self-interest itself.
Finally, it is obvious that both voters and jurors are potentially
subject to a wide range of biases that might prevent them from
evaluating information rationally. Just as voters are subject to
partisan and ideological biases, among others, jurors might be
susceptible to racial, ideological, and other prejudices of their own.
These similarities are potentially significant. But they coexist
with major differences that cut in favor of jurors, making it likely
that they will be more knowledgeable and less biased than voters.
The biggest information-related difference between jurors and
voters is that the decisions of individual jurors are far more likely
to make a real difference. Elections typically have thousands or
millions of voters, each of whom has only a tiny chance of casting a
decisive ballot. By contrast, state civil and criminal juries have six
to twelve members.34 The Supreme Court has ruled that six-person
juries are permissible, but refused to go as low as five in criminal
cases.35 Federal criminal juries are still required to have the
traditional number of twelve.36
In a small group of six to twelve, each individual vote has a high
likelihood of affecting the outcome. In cases where juries must reach
unanimous verdicts, a single vote virtually always has the power to
change the outcome.37 Even in cases where only a majority or
supermajority verdict is required,38 a single juror’s vote is far more
likely to be decisive than that of any single voter in an election.
34. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the
Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 427-30 (2009).
35. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243-45 (1978) (ruling that five-person juries in
criminal cases are unconstitutional); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1973)
(permitting six-person juries in federal civil trials); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970)
(permitting six-person juries in state trials).
36. With respect to federal criminal cases, the Supreme Court has never overturned the
holding of Thompson v. Utah that the Constitution requires twelve-member juries. 170 U.S.
343, 350-51 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 47
(1990).
37. Though, if a lone holdout causes a hung jury, there is always the possibility that a
retrial will result in the same outcome favored by the majority in the first trial.
38. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The
Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006) (noting that
twenty-nine states require only supermajority verdicts in civil cases, while three accept
nonunanimous verdicts if a jury remains deadlocked after six hours of deliberation). Only two
states allow nonunanimous verdicts in criminal felony cases. Id.
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Obviously, the small size of juries also makes it easier for any
one juror to try to influence the votes of others than it is for voters
in an election to do so. In electoral politics, only a tiny fraction of the
population has the kind of influence necessary to have more than a
miniscule chance of swinging enough other voters’ decisions to affect
the outcome. Jurors have a much better chance to influence others
through argument and deliberation. The far greater ability of jurors
to influence outcomes gives them a stronger incentive to acquire
knowledge than voters.
This incentive would not matter if jurors were narrowly self-
interested. Potential jurors with a clear financial or other similar
stake in the outcome of a case are likely to be excluded. But, if
jurors are even mildly altruistic and care even modestly about
providing impartial justice for their fellow citizens, the greater
likelihood of decisiveness is likely to be a significant incentive to pay
attention. Once the juror has been empanelled on a trial, the
opportunity costs of paying attention and making a serious effort to
deliberate are relatively low, since there is little else that she can do
with her time during that period. Thus, only a relatively modest
degree of altruism or sense of civic duty would be needed to lead
jurors to respond to the incentive for effort provided by a greater
likelihood of decisiveness. Such moderate altruism is relatively
common, as indicated by various types of evidence.39 For example,
the average American household donates about 4 percent of its
income to charity.40
In elections, moderate altruism is often enough to incentivize
voters to pay the relatively small costs of going to the polls, despite
the low probability of casting a decisive ballot. But, for most voters,
it is not enough incentive to devote the much greater amount of time
and effort necessary to acquire information on the many complex
policy matters at issue.41
In theory, the much lower probability of decisiveness for an
individual vote in an election, as opposed to a jury verdict, could be
offset by the much greater impact of an electoral decision. But, for
39. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 67-68.
40. ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES? THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM: AMERICA’S CHARITY DIVIDE—WHO GIVES, WHO DOESN’T, AND
WHY IT MATTERS 3 (2006).
41. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 63-71.
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a moderately altruistic juror, the expected value of a “correct” jury
vote is still much higher than that for a correct vote in an election.
For example, a moderately altruistic voter who values benefits to
fellow citizens at 1/1000 of the value he would place on a similar
benefit to himself would likely estimate the value of casting a
“correct” vote in a presidential election at somewhere around fifteen
dollars, assuming he perceived a substantial difference in quality
between the two candidates.42 By contrast, if the stake in a trial is,
say, $100,000 or its equivalent value in prison time, the same
1/1000 discount rate yields an expected value of fifty to one hundred
dollars,43 because the probability that any one vote will be decisive
is very high—is nearly certain in the case of a jury with a unanimity
requirement. And, obviously, many civil and criminal cases involve
stakes far greater than $100,000. In criminal cases, a prison
sentence of even two or three years probably imposes far greater
costs on the defendant and society than that. Imprisoning an inmate
for a year costs the government $25,000 or more on average, and
that, of course, does not include the costs inflicted on the prisoner
himself, including lost income and the psychological burden of
incarceration.44 Obviously, few jurors know the exact costs that
imprisonment imposes on society or defendants. But they are at
least likely to have an intuitive sense that the stakes are high. The
same goes for verdicts in all but very small-scale civil suits.
A second key difference between jurors and voters is the scope
and complexity of the issues they consider. Most elections involve an
extremely wide variety of issues, many of them complicated. For
example, the President and Congress deal with issues as varied as
the appointment of judges, defense policy, environmental policy,
taxation, and international trade. State and local governments also
often have a wide range of complex functions. Even the most
knowledgeable voters may find it difficult or impossible to inform
themselves on all the issues at stake in many elections.45
42. Id. at 67 & n.17.
43. I assume, roughly, that the probability of casting a decisive vote ranges from 50
percent to 100 percent.
44. JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 11 (2010),
available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf.
45. I elaborate this point in greater detail in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 140-41.
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By contrast, most jury trials focus on a relatively narrow,
discrete set of questions. A typical criminal trial tries to determine
whether defendant X committed crime Y; a typical civil trial
assesses whether the defendant is liable for some specific harm that
has occurred. This narrowness of focus reduces the cognitive burden
on jurors and also the amount of knowledge they need to possess to
make an informed decision. Obviously, as discussed below,46 there
are complex cases that impose much greater information burdens on
jurors. Most jury trials, however, deal with fewer and less complex
issues than elections do.
A third major difference between jurors and voters is that the
former are required to listen to the evidence and arguments pre-
sented by both sides in a trial and also to consider the views of other
jurors in deliberation. By contrast, most voters devote little if any
effort to acquiring political information, and those that have an
unusually high interest in politics often consider only sources in line
with their preexisting views.47
Finally, it is possible that jury trials usually involve issues that
are less likely to trigger strong ideological biases than elections.
Voters often have strong preexisting ideological or partisan biases
about the issues at stake in elections. By contrast, such biases are
less likely to play a role in most jury trials, especially those that
primarily focus on narrow factual questions about particular
incidents between parties who the jurors have never heard of.
Overall, there are plausible theoretical reasons for believing that
jurors are less likely to suffer from problems of ignorance and
irrationality than voters. Part II considers the extent to which this
is actually true.
II. THE EVIDENCE ON JURY IGNORANCE AND BIAS
The available evidence on jury ignorance and bias suggests that
jurors perform somewhat better than what we know of voters. But
they do nonetheless have information problems in complex cases
involving scientific evidence and expert testimony.
46. See infra Part II.
47. See discussion of these points supra Part I.A-B.
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A. Favorable Evidence on Jury Knowledge and Objectivity
There is considerable evidence supporting the view that, in most
cases, juries do not suffer from a serious knowledge deficit. A variety
of studies conducted over a period of almost fifty years find a high
rate of agreement on case outcomes between juries and judges. By
assumption, the latter are presumed to be relatively knowledgeable;
therefore, if juries reach similar results to those of judges, they are
likely to have adequate information or at least no worse than that
possessed by legal professionals.
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s classic 1966 study, The
American Jury, found that jurors reach the same decisions as judges
would have in 78 percent of cases.48 Several more recent studies
have reached similar results.49 It is also important to note that the
cases where judges and juries disagree do not seem to be dispropor-
tionately those that are unusually complex, as measured by the
amount of evidence involved in the case.50
Some studies that specifically focus on complex cases also find
a high level of jury performance. These include patent cases,51
medical malpractice cases,52 and case studies on medical drug
cases.53 An important recent study by Shari Seidman Diamond,
Beth Murphy, and Mary Rose concludes that civil juries deliberate
carefully and usually pay close attention to the instructions given
by judges, on average developing a good understanding of the
relevant law.54 As discussed below, I have a somewhat less optimis-
tic view of this study’s findings.55
48. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58 (1966).
49. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 148-54 (2007)
(summarizing and discussing studies over the last twenty-five years).
50. Id. at 148-49; see also Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 182 (Robert E. Litan
ed., 1993) (“[T]he jury often appears to do surprisingly well in the face of complexity,
particularly insofar as complexity is defined by length of trial and the introduction of massive
arrays of evidence.”).
51. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000).
52. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 121-44 (1995).
53. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 153.
54. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations:
Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1552-57 (2012).
55. See infra Part II.B.
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The evidence on judge-jury agreement is impressive. If juries, on
average, perform as well as judges, that suggests they achieve a
fairly high degree of competence. But this conclusion is subject to
important caveats. First, agreement between judges and juries may
sometimes be the result of ignorance among the former as much as
knowledge among the latter.56 Most American judges are generalists
who may lack expertise in particular types of cases, especially
complex cases involving difficult policy issues or scientific evidence.
As Judge Richard Posner emphasizes, “A judge is a generalist who
writes an opinion under pressure of time in whatever case, in
whatever field of law, is assigned to him.”57 Posner’s analysis focuses
primarily on appellate judges.58 But the same point applies to most
trial judges at both the state and federal level, who also hear a wide
range of cases. Judges nonetheless know more than jurors do about
legal doctrine. But their superiority in judging scientific evidence
and other complex issues may be far less clear.
Second, the fact that the cases where judges and juries disagree
are not disproportionately those with the most evidence does not
necessarily prove that there isn’t a greater divergence in more
complex cases. Quantity of evidence is not the same thing as
complexity. A case could turn on a large amount of simple evidence
or, conversely, a small amount of complex evidence. For example, a
standard “whodunit” could turn on the testimony of numerous
different eyewitnesses. It may be time-consuming to figure out
which witness is telling the truth. But doing so is not inherently
complicated and arguably does not require specialized knowledge.
On the other hand, a case could turn on just one or two pieces of
extremely complex evidence or testimony. Examples might include
an environmental tort case that turns on a single piece of scientific
data, or an antitrust case that turns on economists’ testimony about
the effects on competitiveness of a single business decision.
Judges also enjoy a number of advantages over jurors that are
not easily measured, but could turn out to be significant. For
example, they can take account of precedents created by previous
cases (which jurors usually cannot do). Similarly, judges, but not
jurors, usually have to justify their decisions in written opinions; the
56. This possibility was brought to my attention by David Bernstein.
57. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 206 (2008).
58. See id. at 205.
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process of drafting an opinion might help judges consider the issues
more carefully and weed out some potential errors. Judges might
also avoid some errors because the fear of being overruled by a
higher court might lead them to consider the issues more carefully.59
Finally, as discussed below, more narrowly focused studies show
greater evidence of bias and ignorance by jurors, especially in more
complicated cases. It may be that jury knowledge is sufficient to
deal with run of the mill cases, but not those that address unusually
complex issues or have complicated scientific evidence.
B. Negative Evidence on Jury Knowledge and Objectivity
Despite the extensive positive evidence on juror knowledge,
there is also a substantial amount of evidence cutting the other way.
Much of it deals with complex cases and cases involving expert
testimony where ignorance is particularly likely to be a problem.
There is also significant evidence that jurors, like voters, often allow
bias to influence their evaluation of evidence.
Many studies find that jurors do a poor job of evaluating expert
evidence.60 While the adversarial process can help engender
skepticism about biased testimony by paid experts, the result may
make jurors equally skeptical about the experts on both sides rather
than enable them to tell the difference between high-quality and
low-quality expert testimony.61 A leading study of one major series
of mass tort cases concludes that “[i]f there is one lesson to be drawn
from these cases, one single overarching problem revealed by the
Bendectin litigation, it is that in cases involving complex scientific
evidence juries have a difficult time reaching the truth.”62 Other
59. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2006) (arguing that the threat of reversal on appeal is likely to lead to better decision
making by lower court judges).
60. See, e.g., Bradley D. McAuliff & Margaret Bull Kovera, Juror Need for Cognition and
Sensitivity to Methodological Flaws in Expert Evidence, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 385, 402-
03 (2008); see also Bradley D. McAuliff et al., Can Jurors Recognize Missing Control Groups,
Confounds, and Experimenter Bias in Psychological Science?, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 247,
253-55 (2009).
61. For studies reaching this conclusion, see JOSEPH SANDERS, BENEDICTIN ON TRIAL: A
STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 120-30 (1998); Lora M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The
Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert
Evidence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 363 (2008).
62. SANDERS, supra note 61, at 193.
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studies have reported more positive results about jurors’ compre-
hension of expert testimony and conclude that jurors effectively
evaluate experts despite their own lack of scientific expertise.63
Overall, however, jurors still find it difficult to evaluate expert
evidence, in part because they must evaluate disagreements
between experts on issues about which they themselves have little
knowledge. Even relative optimists about jurors’ abilities recognize
that they often differentiate between experts based on such dubious
factors as how much money the experts had been paid and whether
the experts used “concrete examples” rather than summaries of
research findings in their presentations to juries.64 Richard
Lempert, author of a leading optimistic assessment of jurors’ ability
to deal with complex cases, nonetheless cautions that “[a] special
problem of understanding arises when there is a conflict of expert
testimony,” because “when the two sides provide different interpre-
tations of a situation, a person who previously knew nothing about
the issue may have little basis for choosing between them.”65 As
Scott Brewer puts it, the underlying issue is this: “if a judge or a
jury does not have the requisite scientific training, how can that
judge or jury make a warranted choice between competing ... claims
by putative experts?”66
Jurors have similar problems understanding and following legal
instructions given to them by judges. Even scholars generally
optimistic about the performance of juries find that such problems
are common.67 A major recent study of fifty actual jury deliberations
by Shari Seidman Diamond and her colleagues found that about 19
percent of juror comments referencing the instructions they received
63. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 179 (summarizing several such studies); see
also Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony:
Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441 (2003) (finding that
jurors generally assess expert testimony well); Phillip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1492-95 (2007) (same); Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide
Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical
Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 906 (1994) (“Anecdotes about the widespread malperformance
of juries do not stand up to systematic data.”).
64. The higher paid expert was trusted less. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 180.
65. Lempert, supra note 50, at 192.
66. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1552-53 (1998).
67. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 50, at 201-05.
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from the judge were inaccurate.68 Some 83 percent of these mistakes
were due to failures of comprehension, and such failures occurred
in all but two of the fifty cases.69 Only about 47 percent of the
mistakes were corrected by either the judge or another juror.70
Many of these mistakes were a result of jurors misunderstand-
ing simple language in the instructions or misstating legal stan-
dards of proof, rather than failing to understand words that were
used in a special, legal sense distinct from their colloquial mean-
ing.71 Yet both kinds of error are examples of potentially damaging
jury ignorance. Indeed, failure to properly understand simple terms
or burdens of proof is in some ways a more damning example of
ignorance than failure to understand complex technical language.
It suggests that some jurors fail to pay proper attention, possibly
even in much the same way as voters ignore a high percentage of
the political information available to them.
The authors suggest that their findings indicate that jurors “do
not exhibit the abysmal failure in understanding the law that
standard comprehension tests show.”72 It does indeed seem to be
true that jurors’ understanding of instructions is better than
abysmal. But the incidence of error revealed in their data is
nonetheless relatively high.
Professor Diamond and her coauthors found that these kinds of
jury errors affected damage awards in only seven of the fifty cases
studied and did not affect the verdict in any of them.73 The relatively
small sample size makes it difficult to tell whether this error rate is
representative of the legal system as a whole. But if it is, the result
that jury ignorance has substantive effects on damages in 14
percent of cases is not a comforting one.
It is fair to note, as the authors do, that some of these errors
might have been prevented if judges had given jurors better
instructions or clarifications in response to questions.74 But, given
the large number of legal points that lay jurors are likely to be
68. Diamond et al., supra note 54, at 1556. 
69. Id. at 1557-58.
70. Id. at 1558.
71. Id. at 1558-61.
72. Id. at 1540.
73. Id. at 1593.
74. See id.
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ignorant about, it may be unrealistic to expect judges to fully
account for and correct all potential errors of this type.
Other studies of juror understanding of instructions also find
that mistakes are common.75 This is, perhaps, not surprising, given
that most jurors have little or no previous experience with trial
procedure and legal standards. An additional factor may be that,
even with respect to words used in their colloquial sense, most
people are not used to following detailed instructions with the
exactitude and precision required in a legal setting. Everyday
colloquial language is understandably often more fluid and less
precise than legal terminology.
In addition to evidence of ignorance, there is also considerable
evidence of juror bias in evaluating the information they do know.
In some respects, these biases are similar to those of voters, though
probably not as pervasive or severe.
Historically, the most notorious form of bias among American
jurors was racial bias against African-American defendants. There
is a long and sordid history of such bias, especially in southern
states that practiced Jim Crow segregation and excluded nearly all
African-Americans from juries until the 1960s.76 Over the last
several decades, African-Americans have increasingly gained access
to juries on equal terms with whites. Racial prejudice among the
latter has also declined to the point where racially biased convic-
tions are far less common than in the past, though some racial bias
by jurors still persists.77 In many cases where it still occurs, that
bias may be the result of unconscious stereotyping or prejudice
rather than deliberate hostility to a particular racial group.78
Even if racial bias has diminished, other forms of biased
evaluation of evidence persist. Most strikingly, a recent study by
economist Scott Wentland finds that jurors may be influenced by
ideological bias, with juries in relatively Democratic areas awarding
75. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 49, at 158-64 (summarizing many studies, most of
which conclude that jurors often misunderstand instructions and relevant legal standards);
see also ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 91 (summarizing the conventional wisdom that “jurors
do not fathom the instructions [given by judges] and fall back on their own gut reactions or
common sense in deciding how the case should come out”).
76. For a review of this tragic history, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
169-80 (1997); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 61-62.
77. See ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 104.
78. See id. at 273 n.19 (citing various studies on the impact of race on juries).
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far higher punitive damages in tort cases than those in Republicans
ones.79 A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of
Democrats in the area from which the jury pool is drawn leads to an
average increase of $238,000 in damages.80
Such biases may not constitute a deliberate effort to “punish”
ideological enemies regardless of the facts of the case or comparable
deliberate attempts to let ideologically sympathetic defendants get
off lightly. Rather, as with rational irrationality among voters, the
problem may be that jurors have ideological preconceptions that
affect their evaluation of the evidence presented to them, and then
do not try very hard—if at all—to de-bias their judgments.81 Both
jurors and voters may sincerely believe they are judging the facts
objectively, without actually doing so.
Some evidence also suggests that jurors may be biased against
foreign litigants. In a study of litigation in patent cases, foreign
litigants were far less likely to prevail in cases decided by jurors
than judges.82 It is notable that patent cases are often highly
technical in nature, and may be more susceptible to xenophobic and
other biases than relatively simple cases would be.
Other biases may also affect jury decision making. A well-known
study by Professor Cass Sunstein and several colleagues found that
emotional “outrage” responses lead jurors to make “erratic” and
inconsistent damage awards, often with little reference to the actual
magnitude of the harm inflicted by the defendants’ actions.83 Other
studies find that jury awards of punitive damages are more erratic
and less clearly related to compensatory damages than are awards
determined by judges.84 Law and economics scholar Frank Buckley
79. See Scott Wentland, Political Beliefs and Tort Awards: Evidence of Rationally Political
Jurors from Two Data Sets, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 619, 628-29 (2012).
80. Id. at 620.
81. I discuss this point in regards to voters in greater detail in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 78-82; cf. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1135-68 (2012) (describing the ubiquity of implicit bias in
influencing legal decision making).
82. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1504
(2003).
83. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURORS DECIDE 31-32, 36-37, 39-41
(2002). For a critique of some of these conclusions, see Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries
Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 (2003).
84. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform,
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-17 (2004); see W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1
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argues that the Canadian civil litigation system is superior to that
of the United States, in part because Canada makes little or no use
of civil juries, whereas in the United States “juror ignorance and
passion” may deserve “much of the blame for outrageous damages
awards.”85
A 2001 survey by economist Kip Viscusi compared judges’ and
juries’ assessments of risks in hypothetical tort cases and found that
judges were less likely to make errors in applying legal negligence
standards and also less likely to err in analyses of risk estimates.86
Most strikingly, jurors tend to actually “punish” defendant firms for
conducting risk analyses in advance.87 This is perverse behavior
because advance weighing of risks is part of what a well-functioning
tort system is intended to achieve.88 Jurors in such cases also ignore
the costs of precautions per life saved, even though, in a society
where it is impossible and undesirable to reduce risk to zero, this
should be a crucial consideration in determining whether failure to
take a given precaution was negligent.89 Jurors may engage in
similar dubious risk assessments in criminal cases, where surveys
show they are willing to tolerate much higher risks of error than
conventional wisdom would consider acceptable.90
Another common problem is hindsight bias, as a result of which
jurors determine liability based on the consequences of the defen-
dant’s actions rather than based on the reasonableness of decisions
at the time he or she acted.91 This kind of bias affects judges and
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 58-59 (1999) (finding that although judges make cognitive errors in
assessing risks and punitive damages, they make fewer errors than juries).
85. Frank H. Buckley, The Rule of Law in America, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON
THE RULE OF LAW 3, 18 (Frank H. Buckley ed., 2013). But cf. Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik
Veel, A Tamer Tort Law: The Canada-U.S. Divide, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE
RULE OF LAW supra at 229, 236-37 (noting conflicting evidence on this issue).
86. W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by Courts, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107, 111-15 (2001); see also David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons from “An
American Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1961 (2006) (arguing that jurors are not competent to make complex risk assessments).
87. Viscusi, supra note 86, at 120-24.
88. See id. at 111-12.
89. Id. at 124 tbl.6.
90. Hal R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 625 (2002).
91. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 589-91 (1998) (presenting a study demonstrating the effects
of hindsight bias); Alison C. Smith & Edith Greene, Conduct and Its Consequences: Attempts
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other decision makers, as well as jurors.92 But jurors may be more
susceptible to it because—relative to judges or other experts—they
are less likely to know much about the full universe of possible
outcomes and may only be presented with the result in the case
immediately before them: which may be highly atypical and a low-
probability event.93
Many of the studies documenting mistakes by juries are based
on survey data, rather than actual jury deliberations.94 It is likely
that deliberation with better-informed or less-biased jurors could
moderate the impact of these errors in real-world cases. However,
deliberation can also accentuate biases and errors rather than
moderate them.95 This is especially likely when the deliberation
occurs within groups whose preexisting biases are relatively
homogenous.96 Juries with homogenous biases are likely to be
common because jurors are usually selected on a geographic basis
and political ideology is often highly correlated with residence.97 But
such deliberation-induced polarization can occur even within mixed
groups, as participants may become entrenched in their preexisting
views.98
In some cases, however, deliberation with better-informed
participants does lead jurors to moderate their biases and make
better decisions. In their contribution to this symposium, Shari
Seidman Diamond, Mary Rose, and Beth Murphy show that many
juries include participants with expertise relevant to the case, and
that their contributions to deliberations sometimes sway other
jurors.99 At the same time, they also show that such “embedded
experts” do not seem to have significantly more influence on
at Debiasing Jury Judgments, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 505, 506 (2005) (describing the bias).
92. See Rachlinski, supra note 91, at 588.
93. This key difference between judges and jurors is emphasized in Viscusi, supra note
86, at 109-10.
94. See, e.g., id. at 109.
95. See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, When Deliberation Produces
Extremism, 22 CRITICAL REV. 227, 245-46 (2010).
96. Id. at 229-39.
97. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA
IS TEARING US APART 9-10 (2009) (documenting increasing ideological homogeneity within
geographic regions).
98. See Schkade et al., supra note 95, at 239-40 (citing studies that suggest this).
99. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Embedded Experts on Real Juries, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. *905-07, *919-26 (2014) (documenting such effects). 
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outcomes than jurors who lack such expertise.100 Indeed, juror
experts were disproportionately likely to end up as isolated holdouts
on a jury, which suggests resistance to their expertise by other
jurors.101
Professor Diamond and her coauthors emphasize a positive
implication of these findings: that expert jurors are not exercising
disproportionate influence on trial outcomes,102 thereby obviating
the supposed need for judicial intervention to exclude them from
juries, as advocated by some scholars.103 But the findings might also
be interpreted more pessimistically—as evidence that nonexpert
jurors are too little influenced by their more knowledgeable fellows.
C. Implications
Despite their limitations, it is significant that jurors still reach
decisions similar to those of judges in the vast majority of cases.104
This suggests that their knowledge levels and use of information
are, in most cases, roughly on par with that of knowledgeable
professionals, albeit ones that are often not experts on the issues
involved in the specific case at hand.
On the other hand, jury knowledge and objectivity is less
impressive in cases that call for more complex judgment, such as
evaluation of risk, punitive damages, and scientific evidence.105
Jurors also often misunderstand judges’ instructions on the law.106
The situations where jury knowledge and objectivity are more
likely to break down are, for the most part, those where their
100. See id. at 913-14, 926 (concluding that there is “surprisingly little evidence that as a
group the juror experts exerted a particularly powerful influence” on the trial outcome “based
on an aura of authority stemming from their greater expertise”).
101. Id. at 915-16. In Arizona, where the Diamond et al. study was conducted, civil juries
need only a majority of six out of eight participants in order to reach a verdict. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 21-102(D) (2012). The “holdouts” referred to in the study were jurors who
dissented from a final verdict. Diamond et al., supra note 99, at 915-16.
102. Diamond et al., supra note 99, at 926.
103. For examples of such proposals, see Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror,
75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 535-36 (2002) and Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar
Predicament of Professional Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 270-72 (2007).
104. See discussion supra Part II.A.
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See supra Part II.B.
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advantages over voters are less likely to compensate for their prior
ignorance of the issues at stake in a case.
The more complex and technical the issues, the more difficult it
is for laypeople to understand them simply by listening carefully to
testimony presented in court. The more rigorous the analysis
required to consider the relevant evidence in a case, the more
difficult it is to overcome cognitive biases in assessing it. Jurors’
primary advantages over voters are the limited scope of the inquiry
they must perform and the greater incentive to perform it well
caused by the much higher likelihood that their votes will be
decisive. In complex, technical cases, however, putting in a greater
effort than that made by the average voter may not be enough to
really grasp the issues or consider them in an unbiased way.
It is also worth noting that cases involving such issues as
punitive damages and corporate risk assessment implicate broad
public policy concerns that go beyond the narrower “whodunit”
questions at stake in more conventional cases. Not surprisingly, the
former may stimulate ideological and other biases of the sort that
also bedevil voters.107
Problems such as these have led some scholars to propose
limiting the use of juries in complex cases,108 or alternatively, using
juries specially selected for education or expertise.109 Not surpris-
ingly, better-educated jurors on average have a better understand-
ing of scientific evidence.110
The juror shortcomings described here fall short of definitively
proving that such proposals should be adopted. Knowledge and bias
are not the only factors that need to be considered in determining
whether a given task in the legal system should be entrusted to
ordinary jurors, specialized ones, or judges. For example, even if
107. See supra Part II.B; see also Wentland, supra note 79, at 629.
108. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, at 242-43 (advocating increased oversight
of juries by judges in punitive damages cases and moving away from punitive damages to civil
fines).
109. See, e.g., Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling
for Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 15
(1998) (arguing for the use of specialized professional juries in such cases); Franklin Strier,
The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 49, 50 (1997)
(arguing that complex cases should have a minimum number of highly educated jurors).
110. Valerie Hans et al., Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial
DNA Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 69 (2011).
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judges are more knowledgeable and less biased than jurors, it is
possible that the latter are preferable on other grounds, such as
their greater ability to reflect the values of the community or their
greater willingness to “nullify” unjust laws.111 Similarly, the
knowledge shortcomings of voters do not prove that we should
abandon the use of democracy for all political decisions or that the
electorate should be limited to the most knowledgeable and best-
educated citizens.112 Nonetheless, the problem of jury ignorance and
bias at least strengthens the case for institutional reforms that
transfer decision-making authority to more knowledgeable hands,
even if it does not decisively clinch it.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF JURIES BEYOND THE
COURTROOM
In recent years, a variety of scholars have proposed using jury-
like mechanisms to strengthen public participation in government
and increase citizens’ political knowledge. Famed constitutional law
scholar Bruce Ackerman and political scientist James Fishkin have
developed a “Deliberation Day” proposal in which all voters will be
incentivized to attend a one day session of presentations and
discussions on public policy issues before each election.113 Professor
Ethan Leib advocates the establishment of a “popular” branch of
government in which groups of randomly selected citizens will
participate in making new law.114 More recently, political philoso-
pher Jamie Whyte proposed a system of “national juries” under
which the task of voting in elections should be delegated to a
randomly selected group of twelve voters per district who would “be
spirited away to a place where they will spend a week locked away
111. For modern defenses of jury nullification, see, for example, ABRAMSON, supra note 2,
at 57-95 and Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
112. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 181-85 (discussing
these possibilities and noting some drawbacks).
113. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3 (2004) (describing
Deliberation Day).
114. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 4 (2004).
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with the candidates, attending a series of speeches, debates and
question-and-answer sessions before voting on the final day.”115
Elsewhere, I have criticized the details of such proposals and
argued that they cannot come close to properly informing the juror-
voters about the full range of complex issues addressed by modern
government.116 Here, I briefly consider the implications the litera-
ture on jury ignorance in the courtroom may have for them.
As discussed above, juror knowledge and objectivity seem to be
adequate in relatively simple cases, but often break down in cases
that involve complex evidence and have broad public policy
implications.117 Obviously, the latter are far more akin to the
political decisions that political juries would have to consider.
Jurors’ difficulties in evaluating expert testimony also have
implications for proposals that require political juries to make
decisions based on presentations by partisan public policy experts.118
Citizen jurors may be poor evaluators of such expert testimony.119
If anything, the cognitive difficulties faced by public policy juries
are likely to be far more severe than those facing conventional
jurors in relatively complex legal cases. Even an unusually complex
trial rarely, if ever, includes as many and as complicated issues as
a presidential election. Consider that the federal government
addresses such varied issues as environmental policy, inflation,
unemployment, defense against terrorism, and federal subsidization
of education, among many others.120 Even state and local govern-
ments have far more varied functions than the range of issues that
comes up in a typical trial. Consider, for instance, the vast range of
115. Jamie Whyte, Fewer Voters Are Better Voters, THE BIG QUESTIONS (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.thebigquestions.com/2010/02/25/fewer-voters-are-better-voters/.
116. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 177-80; Ilya
Somin, Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance, 22 CRITICAL REV. 253, 268-72 (2010)
[hereinafter Somin, Deliberative Democracy]. For my critique of Whyte’s plan, see Ilya Somin,
Could National Juries Alleviate the Problem of Political Ignorance?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Mar. 9, 2010, 1:57 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/03/09/could-national-juries-alleviate-
the-problem-of-political-ignorance/ [hereinafter Somin, National Juries].
117. See supra Part II.A-B.
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Peter Glasner, Rights or Rituals? Why Jurors Can Do More Harm than Good,
40 PLA NOTES 43, 43-44 (2001) (arguing that expert testimony by scientists was overvalued
in a Welsh citizen jury experiment).
120. For a discussion of the size of government as an obstacle to adequate voter knowledge,
see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 7, at 139-43.
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functions that a state legislature is responsible for, such as economic
development, infrastructure, environmental protection, law
enforcement, primary and secondary education, funding of state
universities, and land use policy.
Political jurors also face far more temptations to ideological and
other forms of bias than do trial jurors. The issues that arise in
public policy debates are, on average, more ideologically charged
than those in all but a fraction of even the most complicated trials.
Jury-like systems for political decision making did sometimes
work well in ancient Athens, most notably in the case of the Council
of 500, also known as the Boule. The Council of 500 was comprised
of a group of citizens annually chosen by lot to make certain
significant policy and oversight decisions.121 But there are many
crucial differences between ancient Athens and the modern
democratic state that make the former a tenuous precedent for the
latter. Most notably, the ancient Athenian government had many
fewer and less complicated functions, and the members of the
Council of 500 were selected from a class of citizens who usually had
extensive personal experience with most of those functions,
particularly warfare.122
This does not prove that political juries are completely useless
or that they should be categorically banned. They could be useful for
gathering scientific data on the development of public opinion and
possibly for making certain discrete small-scale policy decisions.123
We should also consider experimenting with them in small local
government institutions. There is some evidence suggesting that
small New England town meetings have more and better-informed
voter participation in government than larger jurisdictions with
121. See generally P.J. RHODES, THE ATHENIAN BOULE (1972) (detailing the history of this
institution and its functions). For arguments that it functioned effectively, especially in terms
of utilizing information, see JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND
LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 143-56 (2008).
122. For discussion of these differences, see Ilya Somin, Book Review, 119 ETHICS 585, 589-
90 (2009) (reviewing JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND LEARNING
IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (2008)); see also Somin, National Juries, supra note 116 (discussing a
modern proposal similar to the Council of 500).
123. I briefly consider these possibilities in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE,
supra note 7, at 190-91.
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more complex governments.124 Small-scale local political juries
might be able to build on this success.
Overall, however, the experience of trial juries in complex cases
is a cautionary tale for advocates of the large-scale use of political
juries. Those who seek to alleviate the problem of political igno-
rance, strengthen democratic accountability in government, or
achieve major improvements in public policy will probably have to
look elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
The problems of rational ignorance and rational irrationality
that bedevil voters are much less significant in the case of jurors.
Relative to voters, jurors have substantially stronger incentives to
become well-informed and assess relevant evidence in an unbiased
way. They also usually decide less ideologically charged issues,
which makes it easier to avoid bias.
At the same time, juror knowledge and objectivity are far less
impressive in cases that involve complex evidence or have broad
public policy implications. The more the decisions facing jurors
begin to resemble those considered by voters, the more they seem to
suffer from similar cognitive shortcomings. This has important
ramifications for the advisability of relying on lay jurors in such
cases. It also weakens the case for the use of jury-like institutions
to make public policy outside the courtroom.
The argument of this Article does not prove that we should
necessarily abandon the use of juries, even in the most complex
cases. But it does show that juror ignorance is, in some key ways, a
problem akin to that of political ignorance. Both dangers are real,
and both require careful consideration of potential solutions.
124. See, e.g., FRANK BRYAN, REAL DEMOCRACY: THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN MEETING 123
(2004). But cf. Somin, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 116, at 270-71 (noting that the
absolute level of public knowledge and participation in these jurisdictions is still low).
